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INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS
The following is the result of an invitation to participate as a historian of
mathematics in a symposium on Renaissance philosophy, dealing in particular
with the rôle of the Aristotelian tradition in the genesis of the Early Modern era.
I was, as anticipated by the organizers, somewhat amazed by the invitation--and
all the more so because my immediate feeling was that Aristotelianism (as well
as formal philosophy in general) and mathematics have no close connection
during the Renaissance and the earliest Modern period.
This was only an immediate feeling, since my familiarity with the sources
stopped by the fourteenth century, and since the question was in any event not
one I had considered deeply before, not even in connection with the HighMiddle
Ages.
What follows in then simply an investigation of the question whether
dominating philosophies, in as far as they are at all visible in the mathematical sources,
have stamped (or eventually even determined) the ways in which mathematics developed
from the twelfth through the sixteenth century, or they are purely epiphenomenal.
The answer is of course partly determined by the level on which
»philosophy« is understood. I shall restrict the use of the word to the level of
systematically organized thought, and exclude the loose sense of »attitudes« even
when the attitudes in question could be expressed in terms of some philosophical
system--an artisan is not to be labeled an Aristotelian just because he prefers
empirical methods for a-priorism; I shall, however, also discuss the influences
of proto- and quasi-philosophical attitudes as well as the relations between
philosophies and attitudes.
I shall not discuss the import of further socio-cultural factors. It will, however,
be clear that major channels of influence for these are philosophical and (since
they lack scholarly obligation to well-belaboured tradition and hence also internal
rigidity) especially quasi-philosophical attitudes on the nature and purpose of
mathematics and mathematical activity.
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It will be convenient to discuss the problem in the grid constituted by
conventional periodizations. A first period (»the twelfth century«, in reality with
vaguer limits) is (when seen from the point of view of the history of mathematics)
dominated by the enthusiasm for Euclid and the Almagest, and ends when
Aristotle becomes all-dominating in the artes (and so becomes the all-dominating
problem for ecclesiastical authorities nervous about university curricula). The
second period (»the thirteenth century«) is that of assimilation of Aristotle. The
third period (»the fourteenth century«) presents us with a wealth of creative
developments of Aristotelian philosophy, includingmathematical developments.
During the fourth period (»Early Renaissance«, late fourteenth to mid-sixteenth
century) mathematics and formalized philosophy live largely separately--and
in the fifth period the foundation is laid not least by developments related to mathe-
matics for the creation of the new philosophies of the seventeenth century.
Three problems of method should be mentioned in advance, one practical
and two of principle. The first was already mentioned, viz. that before starting
on the project I was only in possession of reasonable familiarity with sources
from the twelfth through the fourteenth century (and even for this span of time
of course only with a small part of the complete source material). Since then I
have appliedmyself to cover at least essential sources representative of themost
important Renaissance currents (but not of everymajor mathematician). Far from
everything I wanted has, however, been accessible to me; nor have I had the
time to go into reasonable depth with everything which deserved so. Finally
may I of course have overlooked important characters and tendencies
unintentionally or have assessed them wrongly, in which case I will ask for cor-
rection rather than indulgence.
The second and third problems both concern the reality of entities regarded.
Specific philosophies may have some historical coherence over a certain span
of time, though even that can be problematic. Attitudes, tendencies and currents,
however, are elusive concepts though necessary if overall structures are to be
distinguished; their demarcations will by necessity be blurred, at times theywill
overlap, and it will often be impossible to claim that a specific author belongs
to one current and only there. It should be kept in mind that currents etc. may
at times represent poles with relation to which authors can be seen to orientate
themselves rather than classifications.
One entity plays a specific rôle: Mathematics (the third problem). Is it justified
to think of mathematics as something well-defined and possessing continuous
existence from (at least) 1100 to 1700, or is this an anachronism, a piece of whig
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history? Isn’t such an idea in conflict with the obvious observation that the term
covers something very different in the beginning and in the end of the period?
My answer to this Parmenidean point of view will be negative, which can
be argued on several levels. I shall mention two: Socially, the actors themselves,
those who generation for generation recreated the field, were convinced of both
coherence and historical continuity; even a claim that previous generations had
made barbaric or adulteratedmathematics implied an acceptance that they made
mathematics.Metaphysically,mathematics is characterized over the whole period
by being an abstraction from sensible reality, dealing (as stated continuously from
Augustine to Pascal) with a world created according to measure, number and
weight, and susceptible of some sort of argument or proof. Over the centuries the
substance covered by this global characteristic would vary; but the existence of
the category itself was constant.
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THE TWELFTH CENTURY
Medieval learning had inherited from Antiquity the scheme of the Seven
Liberal Arts and, quite as decisive, the idea that these arts constituted the apex
of scientia humana. This idea was promoted not least by Isidore of Seville (c. 560-
636), who remained an important authority throughout the Middle Ages. If we
concentrate interest on the quadrivium part of the scheme (arithmetic, geometry,
music and astronomy), Isidore’s attitude to the subject in his Etymologies is almost
paradoxical: He is full of reverence for these important disciplines, but he knows
next to nothing about them (if we define their contents according to the yardstick
of the Alexandria school). All the same, the empty reverence proved important
over the centuries: At every occasionwhere scholarly activity began burgeoning--
be it Beda’s (c. 673-735) Northumbria, Alcuin’s (c. 735-804) Aachen, Hrabanus
Maurus’ (c. 776-856) Fulda or Gerbert’s (c. 930-1003) school in Rheims,
mathematical subjects were among those cultivated to the extent and in the sense
allowed by current conditions1.
Up to the end of the first millennium the interest in mathematical subjects
is, it seems, mainly to be explained along these lines, as interest in something in
which the good scholar ought to be interested, even though actual needs of ecclesi-
astical scholarly life made computus (Easter-reckoning) the only really living field
from the seventh through ninth centuries2. The final result achieved was the
re-establishment toward the end of the eleventh century of a complete Latin
1 I deal in somewhat more detail with this aspect of Early and Central Medieval
history of mathematics and with the concepts of a »Latin« and a »Christian«
quadrivium (see below) in my 1985a.
2 »Not until forty years after Charle[magne]s’s death, when diocesan schools
began to expand and the manual of Martianus Capella began to influence the
curriculum of some of them, was there a study other than computuswhich dealt
with the mathematical sciences«, as stated emphatically by Ch. W. Jones (1963:
21)--maybe somewhat more emphatically than justified.
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quadrivium, a cycle of mathematical disciplines considered to belong to and to
round off the scientia humana-level of Latin scholarship. Its high point was
Boethius’ Arithmetic. Geometry was represented by compilations of (pseudo-
)practical geometry combining the surviving fragments of Boethius’ translation
of Euclid with material drawn from Roman agrimensors; it included the use of
the so-called Gerbert-abacus. Music was once again a mathematical theory of
harmony (built on Boethius’ translation of Nicomachos), after a dark interlude
where it had dealt with actual song, and astronomy embraced the computus, basic
description of the celestial sphere and the astrolabe, and a little (very little!)
astrology taken over from the Islamic world. Besides, various general expositions
of the aims and authorities of the quadrivial arts were at hand (Martianus
Capella’s Marriage of Philology and Mercury, Cassiodorus’ Introduction to Divine
and Human Readings, and a variety of Medieval compilations).
This was the foundation onwhich scholars had to build their understanding
of mathematics, and with which the more ambitious became dissatisfied in the
early twelfth century. To contemporary observers, this century was a bloom par
excellence of the artes. Historians of philosophy would first of all think of its
beginning as the period of Abaelard and the inception of dialectics’ supremacy.
Abaelard (1079-1142) himself, however, tells us indirectly that the quadrivium
toowas able to foster enthusiasm in the environment of young scholars, through
the name he and Héloïse gave to their son: Astralabius3.
More direct evidence is offered by the translators. A biography of Gherardo
di Cremona (c. 1114-1187), the most prolific of all, tells that he was »educated
from the cradle in the bosom of philosophy« and, dissatisfied with the limits
of Latin studies, »set out for Toledo« to get hold of the Almagest.Having arrived
he stayed there translating the Arabic treasures »until the end of life«4. Another,
anonymous scholar pursued medical studies in Salerno when hearing that a
Greek copy of theAlmagest had arrived to Palermo; accordingly he left for Sicily,
started preparing himself by translating someminor works from the Greek, and
finally translated Ptolemy’s Great Composition5. Adelard of Bath (fl. 1116-1142),
finally, started writing in the tradition of the Latin quadrivium on the Regulae
abaci. The treatise presents us with an overwhelmingly full discussion of this
3 Abaelard, Historia calamitatum, ed. Muckle 1950: 184f.
4 The full fourteenth century biography will be found in Boncompagni 1851a:
387ff, from which I translate.
5 See Haskins 1924: 159-162.
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subject, referring to Boethius’ Arithmetic andMusic, to the traditional system of
sub-units (the mutual multiplication of which gives occasion for many pages),
to Gerbert, and of course to everything connected to the device itself6. Then he
left home »to investigate the studies of the Arabs«7, which resulted first in a
metaphysical treatise De eodem et diverso8, and then in a work on Quaestiones
naturales built in part on what he had learned from the »studies of the Arabs«9,
and in a beautiful array of translations--including various astronomical treatises
and at least one (probably two, possibly even three) translation of the Elements10.
The first effect of the mathematical translations was the completion of what
I have called the »Christian quadrivium«, that quadrivial syllabus which Christian
Latin Europe (»Christianity« understood as an ethnic rather than a religious
identity) considered its legitimate heritage, because it completed the range of
authors, works and disciplines known (like Euclid, Ptolemy etc.) by name from
Isidore, Martianus Capella and Cassiodorus; known (like optics) fromAristotle’s
works, of which most of those not translated before became available during
the same century; or attributed by their titles to Ancient authors (as the »science
of weights« was attributed to Euclid). Islamic authors continuing these same
disciplines were accepted as legitimate and necessary (though morally clearly
secondary) commentators and explanations of the same »Christian« quadrivium
Another effect was the completion of the total range ofmathematical subjects,
which came to include two obviously non-»Christian« disciplines, namely algebra
(and more elementary commercial calculation) and algorism--the latter meaning
6 The treatise was edited by Boncompagni (1881). See the references to Boethius’
translations p. 11119,22; the reference to Gerbert as »having given the technique
back to us Gauls« p. 9123; and the Boethian reference to Pythagoras p. 917.
7 As stated in his Quaestiones naturales, ed. Müller 1934:432.
8 The »first« is hypothetical: According to the dedication the treatise is written
during the seven year voyage to which Adelard refers in the beginning of the
Quaestiones naturales, but the contents seems to belong to the intellectual luggage
which made him set out, not to anything he had learned in Sicily or in the Near
East. This combination fits the beginning of his stay in Syracuse best. See the
edition and discussion in Willner 1903.
9 Even though BoethiusDe musica remains an important source--cf. Müller 1934:
2513 and 2723f.
10 See Clagett, “Adelard of Bath”, DSB I, 63.
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calculation with Hindu numerals, which was soon accepted as a useful and neutral
tool by the environment adopting the new mathematics and astronomy11.
A total survey of the range of translations shows that mathematics played
an important rôle (especially if astronomical and astrological works are counted
as mathematics)--almost, perhaps fully on a par with medical subjects and the
concomitant philosophia naturalis. Another measure of the importance of the
mathematical imports is supplied by traditionalist polemics against the new
learning. In a Sermon to the Purification of the Blessed Mary from the late twelfth
century, Étienne de Tournai complained that many Christians (and even monks
and canons) endangered their salvation by studying
poetical figments, philosophical opinions, the [grammatical] rules of Priscian, the
Laws of Justinian, the doctrine of Galen, the speeches of the rhetors, the ambiguities
of Aristotle, the theorems of Euclid, and the conjectures of Ptolemy. Indeed, the so-
called Liberal Arts are valuable for sharpening the genius and for understanding
the Scriptures; but together with the Philosopher they are to be saluted only from
the doorstep.12
The poets, Priscian’s grammar, the rhetors, and even Aristotle’s discussion
of sophisms, belong to the traditional realm of the trivium; Justinian’s Roman
Law must also be understood as an extension of the study of dialectical Canon
Law and theology, and hence as a traditional subject which aroused a sudden
vigorous interest to the dismay of Bernard of Clairvaux and his companions-in-
arms. The really new learning is represented, we see, by Euclid, Ptolemy, Galen,
and possibly (but probably not) by the »philosophical opinions«. Broader interest
in theoreticalmathematics and in high-level astronomy (not necessarily followed
11 An illustrative example is Gherardo di Cremona himself. In one of his
translations from the Arabic, a Liber mensurationum edited by Busard (1968),
Roman numerals, Hindu numerals and number words written in full are mixed
up completely; even though the Arabic treatise is lost it is fairly certain that all
its numbers were written as full words.
12Non enim in figmentis poeticis, non in opinionibus phylosophicis, in regulis Prisciani,
in legibus Iustiniani, in doctrina Galieni, in oribus rhetoricis, in perplexionibus
Aristotelis, in teorematibus Euclidis, in conjecturis Tolomei, summan studiorum suorum
ponere et tempus suum conterere debet christianus, multominus monachus et canonicus.
Et quidem artes, quas liberales vocant ad acuendum ingenium et intelligentiam Scrip-
turarummultum valent, sed, iuxta philosophum, salutande sunt a limine.Quoted from
Grabmann 1941: 61 (my translation).
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by conspicuous competence) was evidently an important effect of the intellectual
revolution in the twelfth century scholarly environment, and not just a queer
preference of the translators. As we can imagine, below this high level a still
broader interest in less requiring mathematical subjects thrived.
At the very turn of the century, a monumental expression of the interest in
mathematics was created outside the environment of the schools: Leonardo
Fibonacci’s (b. c. 1170, d. after 1240) Liber abaci13 (written 1202, and containing
somewhere between 250 000 and 300 000 words). The work is in principle an
enormously extended algorism, a guide to the use of Hindu numerals not only
for computation but for commercial calculation and algebra in general. If the
work represented more than its author it would be evidence that the interest
in mathematics had penetrated not only the schools but also the commercial
environment of Northern Italy. To some extent this is certainly true; during the
thirteenth century a system of lay commercial education developed in Northern
Italy. The system was centered upon commercial calculation, as evident already
from the name: The abacus school.14 In its immensity, however, Leonardo’s work
is a personal achievement of its author, and (apart from a number of copies of
the manuscript) nothing similar was made for centuries. Leonardo’s genius,
impressive as it is for the historian of mathematics, tells little about the conditions
and intellectual climate of his environment, neither during the twelfth nor the
thirteenth century.
13 Ed. Boncompagni 1857 (from a manuscript of Leonardo’s revision of the work
in 1228).
14 According to the chronicler Giovanni Villani, in 1339 about 1000-1200 Florentine
boys (out of a total city population of 90000) went to one of the six schools where
practical arithmetic was taught (C. T. Davis 1965: 415). See also Fanfani 1951 and
Goldthwaite 1972 on Italian commercial teaching from the fourteenth through
sixteenth centuries.
According to a document reproduced by Goldthwaite (pp. 421ff), the basic
curriculum in a Florentine school »consisted in seven consecutive courses«:
1) arithmetical operations except division; 2)-4) divisionwith one, two andmore
digits; 5) fractions; 6) the Rule of Three; 7) the Florentine monetary system.
Higher subjects would be reserved for the few.
A more precise idea of the teaching can be acquired from the various »abacus
treatises« which have been published. A fine specimen is found in Arrighi 1973.
Obviously, part (but only part) of the inspiration from Leonardo was alive.
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How are we, however, to explain those more modest but still revolutionary
developments which were characteristic of the twelfth century?
Let us first return to Adelard. His Regulae abaci reflect his background in
the traditional Latin Arts, and theDe eodem et diverso and theQuaestiones naturales
demonstrate that he belongs in full right to the current of »twelfth century Platon-
ism«, with its inspiration from the Timaios and its interest in natural
explanation15. This commitment connects directly to the empirical and naturalist
aspect of his translations. There is, however, no direct link from this very atypical
brand of Platonism to pure geometry or mathematics in general. Instead, we
must see it as expressing an uncritical climate of intellectual hunger, where
anything important in relation to the lost intellectual heritage (as understood in
the schools of the early twelfth century, and hence understood not as
antiquarianism but as comprehension of the universe) was to be seized upon--
especially such fundamental works as the Almagest itself and the Elements.
Already Isidore and Augustine had quoted the Bible to the effect that »YOU
made everything in measure and number and weight«16, from which Isidore
concluded that
By number, we are not confounded but instructed. Take away number from
everything, and everything perishes. Deprive the world of computation, and it will
be seized by total blind ignorance, and will be indistinguishable from the other
animals he who does not know how to calculate.17
In the early twelfth century, Adelard and his fellows would see not only
»computation« but the whole range of available mathematics as necessary if a
world created in »measure and number and weight« were to be understood.
15 See also Jolivet 1974, on the conspicuous absence of Biblical explanations from
the Quaestiones naturales.
Discussions of Adelard in thewider context of twelfth century naturalismwill
be found in Chenu 1966 and Stiefel 1977.
16Omnia in mensura, et numero, et pondere fecisti--Wisd.XI, 21; quoted in Augustine,
The City of God XI, xxx (ed. McCracken et al 1966: III, 552), and Isidore, Etymologies
III, iv, 1 (PL 82, 155). My translation.
17 Per numerum siquidem, ne confundamur, instruimur. Tolle numerum rebus
omnibus, et omnia pereunt. Adime saeculo computum, et cuncta ignorantia
complectitur, nec differri potest a caeteris animalibus qui calculi nescit rationem--
Etymologies III, iv, 3 (PL 82, 156). My translation.
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A related but evenmore open attitude is expressed byHugue de Saint-Victor
(c. 1096-1141). InDidascaliconVI, iii he exhorts »learn everything, and afterwards
you shall see that nothing is superfluous«18. The immediate context, to be sure,
is »sacred history«, and strictly speaking we are only exhorted to learn everything
from this subject--but the examples leading up to the conclusion show that
acoustical, arithmetical, and geometrical experimentation and astronomical
observation are no less praiseworthy.
This same all-devouring and undistinguishing appetite is also obvious if we
look at the list of translations undertaken by the single translators19. The interest
was (if we restrict the investigation to mathematics) directed to anything
mathematical at hand; no higher point of view (philosophical or other) beyond
availability and comprehensibility selected the material, which therefore turned
out to constitute a rather eclectic heap by the early thirteenth century. Behind
the total endeavor of translation lay, however, a philosophical formulation of
the intellectual appetite: The interest in the existing world. As long as mathematics
(and indeed anything mathematical) was understood as a necessary tool for this
enterprise, eclecticismwas in itself a consequence of the dominating philosophical
point of view.
Referring to the title of my paper we may therefore claim that philosophy
was only implicitly expressed through the new character of twelfth century
mathematics but on the other hand an essential background to this character
and hence not epiphenomenal. On the other hand, however, the »philosophy« in
question was to a large extent an intellectual attitude rather than an explicitly
formulated structure of thought, especially in its relation to mathematics.
Philosophy stricto sensu was therefore neither essential nor epiphenomenal in
relation to the twelfth century developments of mathematics: It was a sleeping
partner. Moreover, the interest in mathematics was so unspecific, namely an
interest inwhatmight serve as description of the existingworld and in systematic
thought, thatmathematics itself could be declared an epiphenomenon:Mathematics
was chosen because it was traditional, because it promised to fulfill urgent intellectual
needs, and because it happened to be at hand20.
18Omnia disce, videbis postea nihil esse superfluum (PL 176, 801). My translation.
19 This is precisely the way the material is organized in Steinschneider 1904.
20Mathematics was not the only candidate at hand, unless we restrict the concept
of »existing world« to that of »physical world«. For the worlds of metaphysics,
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THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
The thirteenth century is well known in the history of education and
universities to be the century of Aristotelization. Of course, Aristotle could not
displace everything else, and from critical sermonswe know that not only Aristotle
but also geometry and mathematical astronomy could keep students from the
pure spring of theology21. Still, both ecclesiastical trials, surviving university
curricula and the sources in general confirm that Aristotelian learning displaced
every competitor to the position as main intellectual challenge, tool and stimulus.
What happened to mathematics and mathematical interests in the scholarly
environment under these conditions? I shall try to approach this question from
a variety of specific viewpoints before giving a synthetic answer.
First of all it should be emphasized that the general mathematical level among
arts students was apparently raised from (say) 1180 to 1280. The enthusiasm of
translators and their immediate followers should not make us believe that normal
students (even when sharing the enthusiasm) had digested much of the meal
of translations. During the thirteenth century, however, elementary introductions
to the art of algorism and to elementary spherical geometry becamewidespread
at the universities, and computus remained a living subject, treated several times
by Robert Grosseteste (c. 1175-1253) and even by as fine a mathematician as
Campanus de Novara (c. 1220-1296)22. Thanks especially to Alexandre de
moral, Canon Law and the Scriptures the new dialectical methodwas the obvious
choice, and it was certainly no less chosen than mathematics. Both, indeed,
fulfilled the need for intellectual coherence growing out of the flourishing
environment of schools and educated clerks.
21 See the »combined sermon« compiled from a variety of real sermons byHaskins
(1929: 46f).
22 See Thorndike 1954 on the continuation of computistic creativity at least until
the end of the thirteenth century. In fact, Cardano, Stifel and Clavius would still
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Villedieu’s (d. c. 1240) and Sacrobosco’s (fl. 1220-1244) pedagogical successes
these topics were certainly better mastered by many scholars by 1280 than a
century before23.
Interactions with philosophy are, however, not to be expected (nor, in fact,
to be found) at the level of compendia and elementary treatises. At most they
show us that the eclectic temper of the twelfth century had not vanished. What
then about the Elements, probably the best occasion for metamathematical
reflection that could be imagined?
One side of that question is the problem of diffusion: How much was
generally taught? Hardly three or four propositions, if we are to believe Roger
Bacon (c. 1219-c. 1292)24; 15 Books, according to a collection of quaestiones from
Paris25. A commentary probably written by Albert the Great (c. 1200-1280),
dealing (not always very correctly) in full with Book I and briefly with Books
II-IV26 is probably the best hint we can get of the range of normal teaching at
the highest level. If the usual discrepancy between teaching and learning is taken
into account we may safely assume that few scholars, and few active
philosophers, were in possession of a knowledge of theoretical mathematics (or
applied metamathematics) which could serious challenge their philosophical
tranquillity.
The other way round, there is more reason to expect an influence, since
everybody writing on mathematics in the thirteenth century university would
bewell versed inAristotelian philosophy and in the traditionalmetamathematical
theory of the Latin quadrivium, and presumably more disposed to accept his
upbringing than those rebels who had left »the cradle of [Latin] philosophy«
for Toledo or Sicily a hundred years earlier.
write on the subject in the sixteenth century.
23 Cf. Beaujouan 1954 and Evans 1977.
24Opus tertiumVI, ed. Brewer 1859: 21. Given Bacon’s polemical aim and irascible
temper and his lack of deeper mathematical understanding there is of course
no reason to take his testimony to the letter.
25 Discussed in Grabmann 1934. The collection may date from the 1240es, the
time when Bacon was in Paris.
26 Discussed in Tummers 1980.
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The obvious place to look is the Campanus edition of the Elements
themselves27. Its character has been discussed on several occasions by John
Murdoch28, for which reason I shall be very brief. In a certain sense the above
hypothesis is confirmed: Especially in Book V, we find references to Plato’s
Timaios, to Boethius’ De musica, and in particular to Aristotle’s conceptual
gunnery, needed for the discussion of quantity versus number, degrees of
abstraction, and of the necessity that all four quantities in a proportion be of
the same nature in the permutatim mode.
--But only in a certain, restricted sense is Aristotelian philosophy an active
moulding factor. It contributes no doubt to that greater stringency which
distinguishes Campanus’ work from mathematical writings from the tenth
through twelfth centuries. Campanus would never regard the abacus a geome-
trical subject just because it makes use of a ruled board. But there is little
specifically Aristotelian about the stringency, which is rather a stringent
application of mathematical sources. This is revealed even in small details, e.g.
that Campanus speaks of communes animi conceptiones, a traditional Latin
translation of Euclid’s koinai ennoiai, instead of using dignitates, the term used
in current translations for Aristotle’s axioms. What might look superficially as
thorough orientation after Aristotelian modes of thought is rather a didactical
dressing of the subject-matter, connecting it to familiar patterns of thought
without really determining the choice of subject29 or approach.
In so deeply a didactically determined tradition as that of scholasticism (down
to the name, we observe!) superficial correlations with other parts of the
curriculum should cause no amazement, and they can be found everywhere in
the Medieval mathematical sources, which (like Medieval learning in general)
were somewhat at odds with the Aristotelian compartmentalization of
27 Datable to the 1250es (see Benjamin & Toomer 1971: 4f). I used the second Basel
edition from 1546 (Euclidis Megarensis mathematici clarissimi Elementorum
geometricorum libri xv), which contains the Campanus edition in parallel with
Bartolomeo Zamberti’s translation from the Greek.
28 1968; and “Euclid: Transmission of the Elements”, DSB IV, 446f.
29 Even thoughwe are dealing with a translation the choice of subjects is not fully
fixed in advance. In fact, Campanus adds a number of extra propositions to Book
V--cf. Busard 1972: 131ff.
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knowledge30. A field like mathematics might from its internal epistemological
impetus have a tendency to be governed by its own laws and rules, in agreement
with Aristotelian ideals31; but scholars moving in their teaching from one artes-
subject to another, teaching students who followed a broad range of courses,
would rather act against the inherent tendencies of the subject than let their
avowed philosophy strengthen it.
A characteristic instance of such purely external Aristotelization of a
mathematical subject is found in Petrus Philomena de Dacia’s (fl. 1290-1300)
commentary (written 1291/2) to Sacrobosco’s Algorismus vulgaris. Already
Sacrobosco had quoted Boethius’ Arithmetica to the effect that the art of number
be a prerequisite for knowledge of anything, and given the Aristotelian epithets
materialiter and formaliter to Boethius’ two different definitions of number32. In
his commentary to this, Petrus Philomena takes the opportunity to speak broadly
about the four Aristotelian causes of the art of algorism33. Neither in Sacrobosco
nor in Petrus Philomena’s commentary is there, however, any influence of
Aristotelization in what Petrus identifies as the pars executiva.
If we go back in time from Petrus Philomena and Campanus to Jordanus
de Nemore (fl. somewhere between 1220 and 1250) we shall find an author more
governed in his whole mathematical activity by a philosophical stance34. To
some extent this stance was Aristotelian. Firstly, Jordanus appears to have taken
the Aristotelian distinction between different sciences more in earnest than
contemporary mathematicians. So, when writing mathematics (the only subject
30 Cf. the many instances of combination of Boethian arithmetic with themes from
the trivium in Evans 1978.
31 Ideals which had originally been inspired not least by the rise of theoretical
geometry as an autonomous field of knowledge.
32 Compare Sacrobosco’s text in F. S. Pedersen 1983: 1741-4,16-18, with Boethius,
Arithmetica I, ii and I, iii (ed. Friedlein 1867: 12-13).
33 F. S. Pedersen 1983: 81-85. Concerning the »final cause« Petrus states that
»according to the author the purpose of this art is the knowledge of everything;
but I believe that its more immediate purpose is nothing but astronomy« (p. 8235ff;
my translation).
34 In the following discussion of Jordanus I draw heavily on my 1985a. It is to
be observed that Jordanus’s philosophical attitudemust largely be read between
the lines.
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on which he wrote) he would not involve the usual array of didactical cross-
references to other Liberal Arts, nor begin discussing the obvious astronomical
applications of a theory of the stereographic projection. Secondly, one of his
works, the geometrical Liber philotegni (which appears to have grown out of a
series of university lectures, themselves known from a student’s reportatio, the
Liber Jordani de triangulis35) starts by a set of very Aristotelian definitions of
continuitas, punctus, continuitas simplex, duplex and triplex, continuitas recta and
curva, angulus and figura. Thirdly, Jordanus’ Arithmetica36 presents its initial
axioms as dignitates, not as communes animi conceptiones. Fourthly and finally,
most of Jordanus’ works were labelled demonstrationes in their own time, and
probably by theMaster himself, i.e., theywere understood as faithful to the ideals
set forth in the Analytica posteriora, in contrast to the experimenta of algebra and
algorism37.
The second and third feature look like expressions of explicit philosophical
commitment; they are, however, superficial and as irrelevant to the subject-matter
as the Aristotelian causes to the pars executiva in the algorism (and in the proofs
of the Arithmetica the dignitates are referred to as conceptiones). They can safely
be seen either as didactically motivated philosophical lip-service or as joking
flirt (indeed, the reportatiomentioned above suggests that Jordanus’ lectures were
full of jokes). On the other hand, the first and the fourth feature touch the very
essence of the Jordanian opus, and are truly exceptional in the thirteenth century.
Since Jordanus was obviously a pure mathematician by inclination, there is no
35 Critical editions of both treatises in Clagett 1984. The characterization of the
Liber de triangulis as a reportatio is my own conclusion from a close analysis
of stylistic features of the text--see my 1985a.
36 I used the edition in Lefèvre d’Étaples 1514, Book I of which is reprinted in
my 1985. Barnabas B. Hughes is now preparing a critical edition of the work
(personal communication).
37 In the catalogue of his library (the Biblionomia, ed. Delisle 1874: 520-535), Richard
de Fournival (b. 1201, d. before 1260) opposes the Jordanian genre apodixis (the
Aristotelian term translated demonstratio) to precisely such experimenta. As
discussed inmy 1985a, Richard appears to have been personally acquaintedwith
Jordanus and collected apparently all of his works. The characterization of the
genres is hence probably faithful to Jordanus’ own ideas and ideals.
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reason to believe that he needed Aristotle’s permission to be one38;
on the other hand, his personal inclinations, obviously inspired by the Ancient
pure mathematicians, made him agree much better with ideals formulated by
Aristotle in the environment of these same authors than did those who tried
to understand Aristotle on the conditions of the thirteenth century.
There is a certain parallel between Jordanus’ Aristotelianism and that of the
Averroists. In theDe eternitate mundi Boethius de Dacia (fl. 1277) had distinguish-
ed veritas naturalis, the truth of natural philosophy, from veritas christianae fidei
et etiam veritas simpliciter, »Christian, that is genuine, truth«39. As I read the
treatise there is no doubt that Boethius was sincere in admitting the ultimate
truth of Faith; still, being a philosopher by profession, by training and by inclina-
tion he claimed the right (and claimed it an obligation) to investigate that natural
truthwhichwas set into operation at God’s creation. Boethius’ positionwas only
the extreme consequence of an otherwise accepted philosophy (and so indeed
an appropriate expression of the inherent rationale of the Thomistic synthesis);
but being extreme it revealed that the thirteenth century was not disposed to
draw the full consequences of the Aristotelian division of the world into separate
and semi-autonomous levels (nor that autonomy of single social groups which
was its parallel), and Boethius was condemned in 1277.
Jordanus toowas condemned--not by any bishop hostile tomathematics but
by those closest to his enterprise. There seems indeed to have existed in Paris
a whole Jordanian circle in or around the 1240es, embracing among others
Campanus of Novara and in some way even Roger Bacon; but apart from the
otherwise unknown Gérard de Bruxelles, author of a Liber de motu in Jordanian
38 There is even some positive evidence that he didn’t care. Aristotle had once
distinguished the sophist, who when discussing geometrical questions would
use arguments which by nature were alien to geometry, from the pseudographos,
who would use legitimately geometric though misleading arguments (see De
sophisticis elenchis 171b36ff and 171b14ff, and Topica 132a33). In thirteenth century
mathematics both figures were identified with the opponent in a university
disputation, and so they are in Jordanus’ Liber philotegni, prop. 18: Jordanus
apparently felt no need to support himself on Aristotle’s strict distinction though
obeying it himself.
The universitarian tradition continued the quiproquo for centuries: In a
disputation from Leipzig in 1512, falsigrafus is used to designate precisely that
argument which Aristotle uses to exemplify sophist ways (see Suter 1889: 19).
39 Ed. Sajo 1964: 46. Similar formulations passim.
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style, none of his disciples or associates cared to continue or defend the specific
character of Jordanian pure mathematics. On the contrary: those who edited his
treatise on the stereographic projection hurried to put in all those references to
celestial circles, stars and astrolabe which Jordanus had discarded40. Jordanus,
the only mathematician in the Latin thirteenth century doing mathematics in
reasonable agreement with Aristotelian precepts, was eo ipso unacceptable to his
contemporaries.
Essentially, this agrees with the evidence offered by Albert the Great and
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Asmentioned above, Albert appears to havewritten
a commentary on Elements I-IV. According to Tummers’ analysis it is not very
original, drawing heavily on al-Nayrîzî’s commentary and other available
material; the philosophical introduction is apparently »more in keeping with
the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition than with the Aristotelian«41. In the
Aristotelian paraphrases Albert is more philosophically stringent and clearly
Aristotelian,- but he demonstrates no striking mathematical competence, nor
were discussions of infinity and continuity mathematically productive (at most
they were counterproductive, since Albert’s basic point was to »maximize the
gap between mathematics and the natural world«42 and to concentrate interest
on the latter). St. Thomas’s treatment of metamathematical questions (in the
Commentary to Boethius’ De trinitate43) is philosophically more original and
more interesting and much more positive in its evaluation of the relevance of
mathematics for understanding the real world, but it floats miles above the level
of actual mathematical work44. In its consequences, it will have been no more
effective than Albert’s more diffuse and more distrusting attitude.
The place to look for genuinely philosophical inspiration of mathematical
activity is rather outside the most stringently Aristotelian circles, viz.--
commonplace as it is--in the quarters of Neo-Platonic inspiration. Thomas himself
40 Both the original treatise and the different adaptions were edited critically in
Thomson 1978.
41 Tummers 1980: 483.
42Molland 1980: 472. The article containsmany quotations from the paraphrases.
43 See the translation of the relevant Questions V and VI in Maurer 1963, or the
brief discussion in Weisheipl 1975: 134-136.
44 The index in Weisheipl 1975 illustrates this beautifully by its »mathematics,
See science and scientific method«.
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is not fully a stranger to Neo-Platonic ideas, but dissociates himself from those,
»for example, the Pythagoreans and the Platonists«, who asserted »that the objects
of mathematics and universals exist separate from sensible things«45.
This statement expresses Aristotle’s interpretation of the Platonic view; closer
to those inspired by Platonism in the thirteenth century would be a claim that
mathematics was closer to real--divine--reality than are the sensible things. This
point of view results (and resulted) easily when the twelfth century confidence
in the descriptive power of mathematics (as described above) is taken to its
philosophical consequence. In Roger Bacon’s diffuse mind the two views are
not easily separated. In other authors, a clearly Augustinian illuminationist stance
is more obvious though rarely in sole and supreme reign.
A first name to be mentioned is William of Moerbeke (b. c. 1230, d. before
1286), who translated not only Aristotle but also Archimedes, Eutocios, Proclos,
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Philoponos and others directly from the Greek46.
His Neo-Platonic convictions are visible in his choice of authors to translate; in
a Geomantia probably from his own hand; and especially through a dedicatory
letter written by his friend Witelo in the latter’s Perspectiva47. As it is made clear
through the testimony offered by Albert and Thomas, a decision to translate the
full Archimedes was far from inevitable even for a dedicated translator. The
translation itself48 gives no clues for Moerbeke’s motives, but it is a fair guess
that his Neo-Platonism played a major rôle, presumably together with an
incipient philosophically supported friendship with Witelo the mathematician
(Witelo arrived at the Papal court in Viterbo in 1268, at which occasion he met
Moerbeke49, and Moerbeke’s mathematical translations are from 1269).
The connection to Witelo leads us to a whole cluster of names, viz.
Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, Peckham (c. 1230-1292), Witelo (b. c. 1230, d. after c.
1275) and (as a partial contrast) Dietrich von Freiberg (c. 1250-c. 1310), and to
optics, one of the two »new« mathematical disciplines of the Latin thirteenth
century (Jordanus’ statics being the other).
Grosseteste’s rôle in this connection ismainly that of giving inspiration. Like
45Commentary ..., Question V, article 2, transl. Maurer 1963: 34.
46 Detailed list in Minio-Paluello, “Moerbeke, William of”, DSB IX, 434-440.
47 Ed. Risner 1572: II, 1-2; reproduced in Clagett 1976: 8f, note 30.
48 Critical edition and translation in Clagett 1976.
49 See Lindberg 1971: 72.
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every philosopher of his century he was of course inspired by Aristotle,- but
The Philosopher was only one of several authorities to Grosseteste, who was
definitely no Aristotelian as regards his position on the relation of mathematics
to other subjects. In a small and probably very early treatise De artibus
liberalibus50 he tells how informative these are for natural as well as moral
philosophy. The discussion is not profound--astronomy, for instance, is important
(in its astrological appearance) because it tells the right moment to act. Later
works, however, show a fair acquaintancewith astronomy, calendar construction
and the fundamentals of optics51; when seen together with his philosophical
works this mathematical competence makes his influence in his own and later
centuries understandable. Important in the present context is of course his
illuminationist coupling of optics with epistemology and with theologically
tainted metaphysics (the theory of »multiplication of species«).
One of those to be impressed was Roger Bacon, whose grandiloquent
confidence in his own mathematical competence has made later times accept
it. So much truth is contained in the claim that Bacon was familiar with lots of
mathematical authorities (and authorities of any scholarly discipline!), and that
he was able to construct simple but relevant geometrical arguments pertinent
to many optical observations and informal experiments. He combines sense for
physical reality with a belief in the potency in mathematics which seems often
more phantasmagoric than just Neo-Platonic. This would certainly have hadmore
appeal a century or two later, but even in the thirteenth century it might have
aroused an appreciable echo, had Bacon not been kept imprisoned and the
circulation of his writings restricted for reasons which are only indirectly
connected to his mathematical philosophy (if at all). His influence in broader
circles was therefore modest, and passed mainly through whatever Baconian
material was adopted by Peckham and Witelo52. Peckham himself appears to
have belonged to the environment inspired by Grosseteste (in any case, he was
a Franciscan and one of the founding fathers of neo-Augustinianism53) andwrote
50 Ed. Baur 1912: 1-7.
51 Also in Baur 1912. Cf. the discussion in Crombie, “Grosseteste, Robert”, DSB
V, 548-554.
52 See Lindberg 1971 on the connections from Bacon to Witelo and Peckham.
53 Cf. van Steenberghen 1955: 98-104.
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on mystical numerology in combination with Boethian arithmetic54; even in
his Perspectiva communis he reveals himself as a Neo-Platonist of independent
rather than Baconian inspiration--not only in his characterization of the Lord
as lux omnium in the preface (which might be nothing but a poetical metaphor),
but also e.g. in a discussion in prop. I.655 of Moses Maimonides’ claim that there
is an »influence of a particular star directed to each particular species« in this
universe which is »like one organic body«. Probably, Peckham was therefore
primarily interested in optics because of Grossetestian inspiration and Neo-
Platonic inclinations; Bacon supplied him with factual material only.
Witelo seems to present us with a precise analogy to this. As he tells in the
dedicatory letter mentioned above, Moerbeke made him commence the work
as a means to know »how the influence of divine powers (virtutes) affects lower
bodily things through higher bodily powers«56--and according to a remark in
prop. X.42 his first interest in the matter had been aroused by observations of
intriguing physical phenomena57. It appears that Bacon’s optical manuscripts
simply happened to be present and available (through Moerbeke’s influence?)
in Viterbo when they were needed.
It is hence probable that all important writers on optics in the thirteenth
centurywere inspired fromNeo-Platonic philosophy (or at least Neo-Platonically
tainted philosophy), and that most of them sustained a eo-Platonic belief in the
54 See the description of the Arithmetica mystica in Lindberg, “Pecham”, DSB X,
474.
55 Ed. Lindberg 1970. The quotations from Moses Maimonides (which are not
found as quotations but only hinted at in Peckham’s work) are from the Guide
for the Perplexed II,x (on »the influence of the Spheres upon the Earth«)--transl.
Friedländer 1904: 164.
56 Clagett 1976: 8 n. 30; or Risner 1572: II, 1.
57 Risner 1572: II, 440. From the dedicatory letter it seems thatWitelo was already
engaged in Neo-Platonic reflections before meeting Moerbeke (and more
specifically engaged in a workDe ordine entiumwhich he postponed). Moerbeke
will then have explained to him the importance of light for understanding that
Divine light which connects the different orders of entities--an idea which will
have caught Witelo’s interest because of his own physical observations. Witelo
appears not to have brought any Baconian or Grossetestian inspiration with him
to Viterbo: the terms in which the Neo-Platonic ontology is set forth differs from
theirs, and is more orthodox.
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explaining power ofmathematics. The case of the first fourteenth-centurywriter
on the subject, Dietrich of Freiberg,may be different. He rejected the Grossetestian
»metaphysics of light« as well as the belief in the mathematical structure of
Nature58. But he was interested in Neo-Platonic doctrines. All in all, he must
probably be taken as evidence that a mechanical coupling between specific
philosophical doctrines and the interest in optics was less important than more
fundamental levels in the Neo-Platonic orientation, rather than as a witness of
a mathematical autonomization of the subject which by c. 1300 would have cut
it off from philosophical inspiration. The interest in optics is hence a link back-
wards to the twelfth century proto-philosophical enthusiasm for mathematics.
In this respect, the interest in optics is a close parallel to that in astronomy
and astrology--and as we have just seen, the former is often interwoven with
the latter. This rôle for astronomy is nomarvel. If any field confirmed the twelfth
century conception of mathematics as a way to true knowledge it was certainly
astronomy, from computus to Ptolemean planetary theory--and astrology was
then (as we have seen in Grosseteste) the way to make mathematics a way to
knowledge of almost any kind. True,music, themathematical theory of harmony,
can be claimed to be equallywell described throughmathematical relationships.
The theory of harmony, however, would only ask for the use of a fairly simple
arithmetic of proportions and its relation to actual sound was limited. Planetary
astronomy, on the other hand, dealt with the real celestial bodies, and couldmake
use of almost any available level of mathematical sophistication. So, wherever
you were on the level of mathematical learning you might see your own
mathematics as an efficient tool.
Astrology was similarly accessible on many levels. It could be justified
through sophisticatedNeo-Platonic philosophy, as we have seen inMaimonides
and the perspectivists;- but it could also be exerted as a complicated but
aphilosophical technique of prediction and warning, and even be grasped as
such by an illiterate public. No wonder, all in all, that the complex
astronomy+astrology came to be regarded by many as the ultimate purpose of
mathematics (its final cause, as stated by Petrus Philomena)59. This scale of values
58 According to Wallace, “Dietrich von Freiberg”, DSB IV, 92.
59 In reality, it had often been so already in the twelfth century. In this connection
the importance of the Almagest for twelfth century translators will be
remembered. As Lemay (1962) points out, astrological translations were also the
first source for Aristotle’s natural philosophy.
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was institutionally confirmed in the University of Padua, where quadrivial
teaching was given in the common artes and medical faculty by physicians as
a tool for astrologico-medical prognostication60. In other universities and centres
of learning, where ecclesiastical, Thomistic or Albertian skepticism might be
expected to have a greater influence, no institutional fixation occurred, but on
the level of scholarly interests the difference was faint. The irony of history even
led to the result that Albert’s fame in later centuries connected him mainly with
astrological and other occult subjects, on which the list of spurious Albertian
works contain an impressing number61. Even though astronomy led to no
significant development of newmathematical results ormathematical creativity62
there is thus no doubt that the enthusiasm for astrology (and hence the quasi-
philosophical attitudes giving rise to this enthusiasm) was the main incentive
behind the spread of basic mathematical competence in the scholarly environ-
ment63.
So, if we expected the century of Medieval Aristotelianism par excellence to
Twelfth century scholars were also aware that astronomy was a main mobile
for mathematical activity in the Islamic world. This appears from John of
Salisbury’s Metalogicon IV, vi (from 1159), where he tells that »demonstration«,
i.e. the use of the principles expounded in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, had by
his times »practically fallen into disuse. At present demonstration is employed by
practically no one except mathematicians, and even among the latter has come to be
almost exclusively reserved to geometricians. The study of geometry is, however, not
well-known among us, although this science is perhaps in greater use in the region of
Iberia and the confines of Africa. For the peoples of Iberia and Africa employ geometry
more than do any others; they use it as a tool in astronomy. The like is true of the Egyp-
tians, as well as some of the peoples of Arabia« (transl. McGarry 1971: 212).
60 See Siraisi 1973: 67f and passim. The situation was similar in Bologna (see
Rashdall 1936: I, 242f, 248f). On Paris, see Lemay 1976.
61 Albert had in fact written a survey of such subjects, in his Speculum astronomiae,
in quo de libris licitis et illicitis pertractatur (in Albertus Magnus 1651: 656-666).
62 In sharp contrast to what happened in the Islamic world--cf. discussion in my
1987.
63 I leave the discussion of merchants’ mathematics and of the gradually growing
mathematical abilities in non-scholarly environments to my treatment of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
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